Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents by Carpenter, Dale
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
2003
Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents
Dale Carpenter
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carpenter, Dale, "Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents" (2003). Constitutional Commentary. 153.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/153
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS 
Dale Carpenter* 
[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law 
of the Constitution .... 1 
The decision [Brown v. Board of Education] tortured the 
Constitution- the South will torture the decision. 2 
Will nobody defend judicial supremacy anymore?3 
The Supreme Court has made its grab for power. The ques-
tion is: will we let them get away with it?4 
This is a remarkably quiet period in the public life of the 
Constitution. It is not a quiet time for constitutional law profes-
sors, of course, for whom there is always a crisis around the 
bend, a radical departure from fundamental values afoot, a 
usurpation of rights lurking. And there is certainly a lot of activ-
ity related to constitutional law, from the recent impeachment of 
President Clinton to judicial intervention in the election of 2000 
to the creation of military tribunals to try suspected terrorists 
and enemy combatants. 
It is a quiet period, however, in the sense that there is re-
markably little public agitation about either the meaning of the 
Constitution or about the federal judiciary. Two hundred years 
after John Marshall set afloat the U.S.S. Judicial Review-over 
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I want to thank 
Larry Alexander, Brian Bix, Jim Chen, Dan Farber, Mae Kuykendall, Brett McDonnell, 
David McGowan, Shayna Sigman, Elliot Wrenn, and especially Michael Paulsen for their 
helpful comments. All remaining mistakes are theirs alone. 
1. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
2. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 159 (1955) 
(quoting John Temple Graves). 
3. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 385,385 (1994). 
4. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 169 (2001). 
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time slowly refitted and finally re-commissioned as the U.S.S. 
Judicial Supremacy-the sea is calm and the ship sails on. 
Nearly every aspect of Marbury v. Madison5 has been exam-
ined, praised, and criticized: the charged political and factual 
background of the decision, John Marshall's own participation in 
the events that led to it, the opinion's consideration of the merits 
before jurisdiction, its claim that for every right there must be a 
remedy, the assertion that the judiciary may issue orders to an 
executive official, Marshall's strained interpretation of Section 
13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,6 his controversial reading of Ar-
ticle III, the conclusion that the federal judiciary may declare an 
act of a coordinate branch unconstitutional, the various argu-
ments given for that power of judicial review, and many other 
aspects of the case. The spectrum of scholarly opinion ranges 
from those who have treated Marbury as a holy writ of Ameri-
can law, giving it pride of place as the first case reprinted in con-
stitutional law textbooks/ to one scholar who views it as a rela-
tively trivial pronouncement unworthy of the time necessary to 
explain it adequately in an introductory constitutional law 
course.8 
But one modern legacy of Marbury has come recently to 
dominate scholarly debate above all others. In Cooper v. Aaron, 
one of the many cases involving defiance of the Supreme Court's 
declaration that public-school segregation is unconstitutional, 
the Court interpreted Marbury to establish not just judicial re-
view but judicial supremacy, the doctrine that the Supreme 
Court has not just a word, but the final word, on the meaning of 
the Constitution.9 Now a growing number of respected constitu-
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
6. Edward A. Harnett, Not the King's Bench, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2003). 
7. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 
(1997). 
8. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, What are the Facts of Marbury v. Madison, 
20 CONST. COMMENT. 255 (2003). 
9. The judicial-supremacy interpretation has been criticized as an over-reading of 
Marbury. Cite. Marshall's opinion famously claims "it is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) at 
177. The insistent tone of this line ("emphatically," "province," and "duty") hints at a 
paramount role for the courts. That interpretation is aided by Marshall's conclusions that 
(1) the Court may declare an act of Congress void as beyond its constitutional powers, 
and that (2) the Court may issue orders to the Executive branch to comply with its legal 
obligations. /d. Both of these suggest some degree of superiority over the other two 
branches when it comes to legal obligations imposed by the Constitution. Moreover, 
Marshall's discussion of the value of a written constitution as a limit on legislative power, 
combined with the judiciary's role in interpreting it, would be rendered almost purpose-
less if Congress or the President were free to ignore the Court's interpretation and thus 
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tional theorists, coming from a broad range of political and 
jurisprudential perspectives, have begun to question the legiti-
macy of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.10 
This essay examines judicial supremacy and some of its dis-
contents, old and new. Part I surveys the curiously quiet posture 
of the public and their representatives today on the issue of judi-
cial supremacy. Part II contrasts this quiet with other eras when 
neither the people nor their representatives willingly accepted 
judicial supremacy. Part III considers the views of two important 
contemporary critics of judicial supremacy who write from very 
different constitutional and political perspectives. My friend and 
colleague Michael Paulsen argues that the President, as head of 
the coordinate and equal executive branch of the national gov-
ernment, has the power to interpret the Constitution for himself, 
is not obliged to adopt the Court's interpretation of the Consti-
tution, and may even refuse to execute orders from the Court.u 
Professor Larry Kramer argues that the Rehnquist Court has 
transformed judicial supremacy into "judicial sovereignty," 
threatening to erase the idea of "popular constitutionalism" un-
der which the people themselves are ultimately responsible for 
interpreting and implementing their Constitution.12 
exceed the limits of their powers. Marshall nowhere mentions a role for Congress or the 
executive in constitutional interpretation. Thus, though judicial supremacy is not explic-
itly demanded by Marbury, it is suggested and is certainly not inconsistent with Marbury. 
An opposite reading, that Marshall meant only to establish a power of the Court to issue 
declarations of unconstitutionality in particular cases that the other branches were then 
free to contravene, seems less plausible to me. 
10. There is a large literature on this subject, which I do not pretend to review here. 
The most radical critique of judicial supremacy has come from Michael Paulsen, who ar-
gues that state and federal officials (including the President) are not required to follow 
judicial interpretations of the Constitution and may even disobey (in the case of a presi-
dent, refuse to execute) the order of a federal court they believe is wrong as a matter of 
constitutional law as they independently interpret the Constitution. Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What The Law Is, 83 
GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). See Section III. Others have offered a milder critique of judicial 
supremacy, maintaining that while other constitutional interpreters may act on their own 
independent interpretations, they must nevertheless abide by a court order even if they 
think it constitutionally erroneous. Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, 
and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (1999). The milder critique of judicial su-
premacy is practically a surrender to it, since the combination of adherence to judgments 
and stare decisis means the courts will effectively have the last word on constitutional 
disputes. Kramer, supra note 4, at 7. Judicial supremacy, in its strong Cooper formula-
tion, has also been powerfully defended. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). And, 
wouldn't you know it, there have been responses to the defense, see, for example, Hart-
nett supra note 6, and a reply to some of the responses. Larry Alexander and Frederick 
Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy, 17 CON ST. COMMENT. 455 (2000). 
11. Paulsen, supra note 10. 
12. Kramer, supra note 4. 
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I will make the negative case that these critiques of judicial 
supremacy miss the mark. What I will not do here is make an af-
firmative case for judicial supremacy. Such an affirmative case 
could be made from the text, structure, and history of the Con-
stitution, as well as from the repeated acquiescence of the coor-
dinate branches to it and from simple prudence. My argument, 
especially as it relates to Paulsen's thesis, rests on the admittedly 
contestable premise that advocates for changing longstanding 
practices bear the burden of persuasion for changing them. 
I. ALL QUIET ON THE POPULAR FRONT 
At the outset of this essay, I said there is "remarkably" little 
public agitation just now about the Constitution and the role of 
the federal courts in its interpretation because, when you think 
about it, there have been plausible grounds for public provoca-
tion. There has certainly been enough to rile citizens of a conser-
vative political bent. The list of such incitements is very long but 
a short catalogue of the highlights will suffice. In just the past 
forty years, the federal courts, in the name of the Constitution 
and under the guise of intergreting it, have stricken teacher-led 
prayer from public schools, 3 required that children be bussed 
from neighborhood schools to schools across town/4 allowed the 
proliferation of pornography in the public square/5 shielded 
flag-burning/6 and-most galling of all-sharplr limited the 
power of the government to regulate abortion, 1 even to the 
point of strikini down a statute that forbade the practice of late-
term abortion.1 
There's also been plenty, especially in the past two decades 
of conservative judicial ascendancy, to anger citizens with a more 
politically liberal bent. So, the federal courts, again in the name 
of the Constitution and under the guise of interpreting it, struck 
down a state anti-discrimination law that sought to force the Boy 
Scouts to admit openly gay scoutmasters,19 invalidated congres-
13. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
14. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
15. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 
49 (1973). 
16. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
18. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
19. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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sional attempts to deal with the problem of gun possession near 
schools20 and violence against women,21 have upheld many of the 
domestic-security measures taken in the aftermath of September 
11,22 and-most galling of all- halted the counting of votes in the 
2000 election, ensuring that George W. Bush would be the next 
President of the United States.23 
Yet where are the mass protests? Why haven't elections 
over the past four decades been a series of referenda on federal 
judicial appointments? Where are the calls for impeaching Su-
preme Court justices? Why aren't the people-whether conser-
vative or liberal or neither-as upset about all this objectionable 
judicial activity as are the academic participants in this and other 
symposia questioning the very basis for judicial supremacy? 
The people have not always been so quiet about the Consti-
tution or about the Court's role in interpreting it. In fact, there 
has been at least some protest of many of the decisions listed 
above, especially the abortion decisions and the 2000 election 
decision. The abortion decisions continue to draw annual pro-
tests marches in Washington. But anti-Roe activists are no closer 
to having the decision reversed today than they were when 
Ronald Reagan took office and may be even further from their 
goal, thanks to the votes of several Republican appointees,. The 
2000 election decision is largely forgotten, except by the most 
partisan political critics and frustrated academics, for whom it 
will always be 10 p.m. on December 12, 2000. But, as a Gallup 
poll determined on the eve of the decision, seventy-three percent 
of Americans were prepared to accept the Supreme Court's de-
cision as a "legitimate outcome no matter which candidate it fa-
vors."24 
The limited eruptions of late against the federal judiciary 
are nothing compared to the widespread public agitation of 
some earlier times, when Supreme Court decisions engendered 
open defiance, by elected officials, legislatures, and state judges, 
and led to mass protests and riots in the streets.25 Despite Roe, 
20. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
21. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
22. Hamidi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); Center for Nat'! Sec. Studies 
v. Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003); AI Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 
1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003); North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
23. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
24. The Gallup Organization, "Public Willing to Accept Supreme Court as Final 
Arbiter of Election Dispute," at http://www.gallup.com/subscriptionl?m=f&c_id=9940. 
25. See Part II, infra. 
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and Bush v. Gore, and all the other decisions of late that one or 
another constitutional theorist regards as a travesty, America is 
not in a state of constitutional crisis or even close to one. The 
public consistently holds the Supreme Court in high esteem. The 
Court is usually the most trusted of the three branches of the 
federal government-except when the country is at war or very 
close to one, at which point the President's stock temporarily 
rises above that of the other branches.26 
Also significant is the relative silence of the two politically 
accountable branches of the federal government. Members of 
Congress frequently criticize the Court's decisions and question 
the suspected political agendas of the Justices, but these criti-
cisms almost never go to the legitimacy of judicial supremacy in 
constitutional interpretation. Congress is not passing flag-
burning statutes in defiance of the Supreme Court, though such 
acts would have popular support.27 It has not even acted recently 
to limit the Court's jurisdiction to hear certain matters, as it has 
in the past. Similarly, presidents-whether Democrat or Repub-
lican, whether or not serving with a Court favorable to them-
have obeyed orders from the Court. Even Richard Nixon, per-
haps the most zealous claimant to (and abuser of) executive au-
thority in the country's history, backed down when faced with a 
direct order from the Court to produce audiotapes that incrimi-
nated him and led to his resignation.28 There has been no plan to 
pack the Court by enlarging its membership; if one were offered, 
it would be seen as a dangerous and destabilizing power grab, 
just as Franklin Roosevelt's was. 
Then there is the relative silence of the states, whose loud 
opposition to and even open defiance of mandates from the fed-
eral courts have been a recurrent fact of our national political 
life.29 This is not because states have consistently won before the 
court. (Admittedly, part of this may be explained by the fact 
that, as compared to past Courts, the present Court has acted to 
26. Polls routinely show the Supreme Court's favorability rating as very high, while 
those for the President and Congress are usually lower. William H. Rehnquist, 1999 
Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/janOOttb/ 
jan2000.html. 
27. The one attempt to do so, after Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), was 
struck down in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). While Congress has re-
peatedly attempted to amend the Constitution to allow the government to protect the 
flag from physical destruction, it has not passed another flag-burning statute. This sug-
gests, again, that it thoroughly accepts judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation. 
28. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
29. See Part II, infra. 
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limit congressional authority over the states and thus preserve 
the power of the states. But its limitations on congressional 
power have been, well, limited.30) The greatest constraints on the 
states are Court-created doctrines-implied preemption and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause-and there has been no retreat 
from these in the Court's recent precedents. Finally, even the 
Rehnquist Court has not shied from invalidating state laws 
thought to tread on individualliberties?1 
Despite dire predictions and pronouncements that the 
Court has squandered its political capital or eroded its legitimacy 
by one or another ruling, it never has done so for long, even in 
its darkest moments.32 
Why have the public and its elected representatives been so 
quiet? Perhaps the country is preoccupied just now with foreign 
affairs. But that hardly seems a satisfactory explanation for pub-
lic tranquility about the Constitution; there was no great consti-
tutional clamor before September 11. Even waving the bloody 
flag of Bush v. Gore had begun to lose its power to rouse people 
by then. 
Of course, the relative constitutional quietude in which we 
now live is no argument that any single decision of the Court has 
been correct, or even that the general direction of the Court has 
been the best one for the country. But, to the extent critics of ju-
dicial supremacy claim to be speaking for a people whose role 
has been diminished by an arrogant judiciary, we ought at least 
pause to wonder why the people and their formal political or-
gans seem so unconcerned. 
There are, I think, at least two possible explanations for the 
popular calm. One, an unhappy explanation, is that this placidity 
about the Court is just another manifestation of the public's gen-
eral apathy about politics. Why the public is so apathetic is itself 
a puzzle with many possible answers. An anti-supremacist might 
argue that the Court has already so stripped the people of au-
thority to govern themselves that they no longer feel they can 
have any meaningful influence on their government. They have 
given up, not because they welcome being governed by elitist, 
distant, and unaccountable lawyers in black robes, but because 
they have concluded there is very little in practice they can do 
30. See Part III, infra. 
31. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003) (striking down the sodomy laws of 13 
states). 
32. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
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about it. Their political energy has been sapped. But this expla-
nation seems implausible because of the second explanation. 
A second, more benign, and more plausible explanation for 
the people's calm about judicial supremacy contravenes the first. 
It argues that, in fact, the people have not been stripped to any 
significant degree of their ability to govern themselves. They are 
quite capable of dramatically changing or soundly reaffirming 
the direction of their government when they want to, as they did 
in the national elections of 1964, 1968, 1974, 1980, 1992, 1994, 
and 2002. The Court may nibble at the edges of popular rule, 
striking a particular law here and there, but the people them-
selves set the general direction for the country, including con-
trolling at least indirectly the philosophy of the federal courts 
through the appointments process administered by their elected 
representatives. 
The courts have rarely bucked for long a strong national 
consensus.33 They have tended to reflect, not to resist, the domi-
nant national political alliance. If the people still feel themselves 
to be the masters of their fate when they want to be, they are not 
much disturbed by an opinion from the Supreme Court requir-
ing, say, the insertion of a "jurisdictional hook" into a federal 
law banning gun possession near schools.34 On this view the peo-
ple are not concerned about losing their republic to judges be-
cause, in fact, they haven't lost it and are not even close to losing 
it. 
We could say that we really do not care what the people 
think about the Court's gradual theft of their authority. Perhaps 
the people are too uninformed about the danger. Perhaps the is-
sues are just too complicated for them to understand. Perhaps 
they are preoccupied by other issues, prosaic ones, they regard 
as more central to their lives. If so, constitutional theorists may 
have to save their Constitution for them, in part by sounding the 
alarm and waking them from their slumber. But this would be an 
uncomfortably elitist response from commentators who cele-
brate self-government, and who seek to preserve popular consti-
tutionalism, understood as the voice of "the people" in constitu-
tional interpretation. 
33. William G. Ross, Judicial Review: Blessing or Curse?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 733, 766. One exception was the regulation of child labor, which the Supreme Court 
resisted until the 1930s. Kramer, supra note 4, at 121 n.513. 
34. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
2003] JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 413 
II. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE CRITICS THEN 
Opposition to the Supreme Court's authority as final arbiter 
of constitutional meaning has been a sporadic fact of American 
politics since Marbury. That opposition has come from the coor-
dinate branches of the federal government, from the states, and 
from the people themselves. What follows offers only a small 
taste of that opposition, emphasizing popular resistance to Su-
preme Court decisions in the states. The record shows that op-
position to judicial supremacy has commonly been a matter of 
expediency rather than principle. Judicial supremacy has often 
been criticized when the objector's interests are harmed by the 
exercise of judicial authority and invoked when that authority is 
useful. 
Antagonism between Congress and the Court has surfaced 
repeatedly.35 During various Court-curbing periods in its history, 
Congress has utilized or attempted to utilize several methods to 
resist constitutional decisions from the Court.36 As an one exam-
ple, when the Court rejected organized school prayer in Engel 
the public reaction was overwhelmingly hostile. Congressional 
rhetoric was correspondingly super-charged, with one represen-
tative calling it "the most tragic decision in the history of the 
United States.'m A proposed constitutional amendment to allow 
organized school prayer failed. 38 The most Congress managed in 
response was a unanimous vote to place the words "In God We 
Trust" behind the House Speaker's desk.39 President Kennedy's 
reaction was meeker still, fully accepting the supreme interpre-
tive authority of the Court: 
The Supreme Court has made its judgment. Some will dis-
agree and others will agree. In the efforts we're making to 
maintain our Constitutional principles, we will have to abide by 
what the Supreme Court says. 40 
He then suggested that Americans' remedy was to pray 
more at home and to attend church. 41 Outright congressional de-
fiance of the Supreme Court, as opposed to mere criticism or 
35. See, e.g., C. HERMAN PRITCHEIT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT 
(1961). 
36. StuartS. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, in THE IMPACT OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 35, 42-44 (Theodore L. Becker ed., 1969). 
37. THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, supra note 36, at 22. 
38. !d. at 23-24. 
39. !d. 
40. !d. at 25 (emphasis added). 
41. !d. 
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court-curbing actions concededly within congressional authority, 
is rarer still.42 
Occasional statements of opposition to judicial supremacy 
from Presidents have been widely discussed. Suffice it to say the 
opposition has come from our most revered presidents. Thomas 
Jefferson maintained that the Court could not order the Con-
gress or the President to comply even with the most clear obliga-
tions imposed on them by law and the Constitution, such as fail-
ing to take a census or refusing to issue "requisite commissions" 
of judges (the latter being an unmistakable reference to Mar-
bury).43 Andrew Jackson, vetoing partly on constitutional 
grounds the re-chartering of the National Bank whose constitu-
tionality the Court had upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland,44 
averred that the Supreme Court had no more authority over the 
Congress or the President on matters of constitutional meaning 
than they had over it.45 Abraham Lincoln somewhat ambigu-
ously challenged the Court's authority after Dred Scott, suggest-
ing that while parties to a particular decision were bound by it, 
no part of the government was bound to follow the decision in 
future policymaking.46 Franklin Roosevelt thought that the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches could not "stand idly by and [] 
permit the decision of the Supreme Court to be carried through 
to its logical, inescapable conclusion" where that would "so im-
peril the economic and political security of this nation that the 
legislative and executive officers of the Government" must act 
contrary to the decision.47 Each of these statements, it should be 
noted, occurred in contexts where a Court ruling contravened or 
threatened to contravene the president's own policy preferences. 
42. Congressional leaders have occasionally challenged judicial supremacy. North-
erners, frustrated with a pro-slavery Supreme Court, even began adopting the language 
of states' rights to oppose the Court's authority. In 1850, Ohio Senator Salmon P. Chase, 
who later succeeded Roger Taney as Chief Justice, disagreed with a Supreme Court deci-
sion, adopting Jefferson's and Jackson's views in declaring that Congress was not bound 
by the Court's decisions. In 1852, Charles Sumner similarly declared the Court "cannot 
control our duty as to legislation .... " FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE 
UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO 1776-1876, at 172-73 (2000). 
43. Letter to William C. Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820 in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 160 (PaulL. Forded., 1899). 
44. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
45. Veto Message, July 10, 1832 in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 
576, 581-83 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896). 
46. First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861 in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, supra note 45, at 5, 9-10. 
47. Proposed speech on the Gold Clause Cases, Feb. 1935, in 1 F.D.R.-HIS 
PERSONAL LETTERS, 1928-1945, at 459-60 (Elliott Roosevelt ed., 1950). 
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Despite these occasional executive statements criticizing ju-
dicial authority, however, outright defiance of federal court or-
ders by the executive branch has been rare. The only example of 
actual defiance of a federal court order may be Lincoln's deci-
sion to ignore an order to release a prisoner held by federal au-
thorities when Lincoln suspended habeas corpus in part of Mary-
land shortly after the Civil War began.48 But even this example is 
ambiguous. 
Defiance of judicial supremacy has been more direct and 
more common from the states, at least when it suited their self-
interest. The early challenge by the Virginia state courts to the 
Court's role as supreme constitutional expositor is well known, 
resulting in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.49 The Court's attempt to 
assert judicial supremacy over the states was strongly criticized 
in Virginia's newspapers, leading Marshall to complain privately 
that there was "no such thing as a free press in Virginia. "50 Yet 
when the Court ruled for Virginia in a dispute with Kentucky 
over the constitutionality of a Kentucky law benefitting its own 
inhabitants in a land-boundary dispute,51 Virginians overwhelm-
ingly welcomed the decision.52 Henry Clay complained that the 
Court's decision "cripples the Sovereign power" of a state more 
"than any other measure ever affected the Independence of any 
state in this Union, and not a Virginia voice is heard against the 
decision. "53 
In McCulloch, the Court struck down a Maryland tax on the 
National Bank of the United States. Several states refused to fol-
low the decision. Ohio's state auditor, in contempt of a federal 
district court order, seized by force more than $120,000 from the 
Bank's Ohio branch to collect state taxes.54 In Kentucky, the 
state legislature asked the governor to advise it how "to refuse 
obedience to the decisions and mandates of the Supreme Court 
48. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). Lincoln's 
defiance is described in WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (2000); and in Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power 
and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
81 (1993). See Part III, infra. 
49. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
50. McDoNALD, supra note 42, at 79. Writers in Ohio and Kentucky began a dec-
ade-long campaign to challenge the federal courts. /d. 
51. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). 
52. McDoNALD, supra note 42, at 80. 
53. Henry Clay to Francis T. Brooke, August 28, 1823, in 3 THE PAPERS OF HENRY 
CLAY 478-79 (James F. Hopkins ed., 1963). 
54. MCDONALD, supra note 42, at 82. The controversy resulted in Osborn v. Bank 
of the United States. 
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of the United States considered erroneous and unconstitutional" 
and asked whether "it may be advisable to call forth the physical 
power of the State" to defy the Court. 55 
When the Court, in 1854, struck down on Contract Clause 
grounds a state statute depriving a bank of exemption from taxa-
tion granted in its act of incorporation, an Ohio newspaper de-
nounced the Court as a "silk-gowned fogydom, a goodly portion 
of it imbecile with age, a portion anti-republican in notions, a 
portion wedded to the antiquated doctrine of established prece-
dents, no matter whether truth or fallacy."56 
Also in 1854, the California supreme court openly chal-
lenged the Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction 
over the states because such jurisdiction surrenders "a power 
which belongs to the sovereignty we represent. ... " Accordingly, 
the California court held that a congressional act giving jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts over appeals from state courts, the con-
stitutionality of which had been affirmed by federal courts, was 
unconstitutional. 57 
In general, after Marbury, the North had been more com-
fortable with judicial supremacy than had the South. For exam-
ple, in the 1830s, noted the New York Times, South Carolina had 
"denied the paramount authority of the Court" while Massachu-
setts asserted the "absolute, unqualified duty of every citizen and 
every State to yield implicit obedience to its decisions upon all 
questions. "58 
As the Supreme Court became more favorable to Southern 
interests during Chief Justice Taney's tenure, however, North-
erners became more critical of judicial supremacy and Southern-
ers began to see it as a bulwark of liberty-a reversal of their 
earlier positions. When Wisconsin state courts defied a federal 
court by ordering the release of a man convicted under the fed-
eral Fugitive Slave Act for assisting a runaway slave, Northern-
ers praised this act of nullification. The abolitionist New York 
Tribune wrote that "the North is just now taking lessons in 
Southern jurisprudence. South Carolina, Georgia, and little Flor-
ida have, at one time or another, displayed a glorious independ-
ence of Federal legislation, whenever it suited their pur-
poses .... " The Wisconsin courts continued to issue writs of 
55. McDONALD, supra note 42, at 84. 
56. Id. at 173. 
57. Johnson v. Gordon, 4 Cal. 368,369 (1854). 
58. MCDONALD, supra note 42, at 175. 
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habeas corpus for the convicted man, the Supreme Court con-
tinued to overrule the decisions, and the matter remained unre-
solved until the Civil War.59 
In the immediate pre-war period, Southern leaders were 
almost unanimous in their praise of the Court and of judicial su-
premacy. Senator James C. Jones of Tennessee gushed, "For pu-
rity, integrity, virtue, honor, and all that ennobles and dignifies, 
it [the Supreme Court] stands unimpeached and unimpeach-
able." South Carolina's Andrew Butler declared that, "Judges 
are the sentinels and defenders of the Constitution .... " Charles-
ton's Southern Quarterly Review argued that all that stood be-
tween the South and the North's "invading flood of aggression" 
was "the barrier of judicial independence which the great archi-
tects of the Constitution have set up." Without the federal 
courts, the "Constitutional order and State's Rights" would be 
"levelled before the rolling waves of that mighty ocean."60 
Fast forward to what C. Vann Woodward has called "the 
Second Reconstruction," the period in the mid-20th century 
when the nation began to undo the institutions of racial segrega-
tion. By that point, as federal courts initiated and led the dis-
mantling of segregation, the South's views on judicial supremacy 
had reversed course again. 61 
When the Court declared in Brown v. Board of Education62 
that public-school segregation violates the Equal Protection 
Clause, there was initially little public outcry in the South be-
cause there seemed little urgency in the Court's command to de-
segregate.63 By the beginning of 1956, however, nineteen federal 
court decisions had ordered desegregation.64 Senator Harry F. 
Byrd of Virginia called for "massive resistance" to Brown. Lead-
ers in his state claimed a right of "interposition" of state author-
ity against the Supreme Court.65 By the end of 1956, eleven 
Southern states had adopted 106 pro-segregation statutes.66 
The states openly defied the Court's constitutional author-
ity. Alabama declared Brown "null, void, and of no effect." 
Georgia announced its intention to ignore the decision. Missis-
59. !d. at 174. 
60. !d. at 175-76. 
61. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 139. 
62. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
63. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 150-53. 
64. !d. at 153. 
65. !d. at 156. 
66. !d. at 162. 
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sippi declared the decision "unconstitutional and of no lawful ef-
fect" and created a State Sovereignty Committee "to prohibit 
compliance ... with the integration decisions." Louisiana's legis-
lature unanimously passed an interposition resolution. An inter-
position act introduced in the Virginia General Assembly de-
clared the "commonwealth is under no obligation to accept 
supinely an unlawful decree of the Supreme Court of the United 
States based upon an authority which is not found in the Consti-
tution of the United States nor any amendment thereto."67 Four 
states imposed sanctions and penalties for compliance with 
Brown. Some states denied funds to school districts that inte-
grated. Georgia went further, making it "a felony for any school 
official of the state or any municipal or county schools to spend 
tax money for public schools in which the races are mixed."6 
Reflecting strong popular opposition to the Brown decision, 
the states devised a variety of measures to frustrate desegrega-
tion. This included converting public schools to "private" schools 
supported by state funds. To slow the pace of litigation, states 
transferred authority over pupil enrollment and assignment to 
local authorities, which made it necessary to sue each local unit. 
Unless the Court's decision in Brown was respected as a man-
date beyond the parties to that case-that is, unless judicial su-
premacy in its strongest form69 were accepted-there were liter-
ally thousands of local school boards that would need to be sued 
to achieve desegregation in the South. "There is no one way, but 
many" to oppose the Brown decision, said Alabama's John 
Temple Graves. "The South proposes to use all of them that 
make for resistance. The decision tortured the Constitution- the 
South will torture the decision. "70 
Nor was Southern resistance to judicial supremacy limited 
to the acts of legislatures or the rhetoric of politicians. It also in-
cluded acts of vigilantism and mob violence, a form of popular 
constitutionalism more common in the early days of the repub-
lic.71 Consider the violence that engulfed Little Rock, Arkansas, 
when a federal court ordered desegregation of the city's schools. 
After nine black schoolchildren entered the school "a huge wait-
67. 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 252, 253 (1956). The state attorney general, however, 
opined that Virginia had no power to "nullify," or to suspend enforcement of, the Court's 
decision in Brown. /d. at 464. 
68. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 156-57. 
69. See Daniel A. Farber, The Importance of Being Final, 20 CONST. COMMENT 359 
(2003). 
70. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 158-60. 
71. Kramer, supra note 4, at 28-29. 
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ing mob, hysterical, shrieking, and belligerent, defied police and 
forced the removal of the Negro children."72 
It is worth recalling that after the Supreme Court issued its 
strong defense of judicial supremacy and reaffirmed the deseg-
regation order in Cooper v. Aaron, Arkansas Governor Orval 
Faubus closed the public schools rather than comply with the or-
der. He was subsequently reelected for an unprecedented third 
term by an overwhelming popular vote.73 
As C. Vann Woodward wrote in his classic work, The 
Strange Career of Jim Crow, this defiance was not confined to 
the South: 
Southern resistance to federal authority received aid and 
comfort from other parts of the country .... In Congress the 
Court was subjected to assaults of explosive violence. The 
House passed bills restricting the Court's powers, and the 
Senate came within eight votes of nullifying several Supreme 
Court decisions and within one vote of prohibiting the Court 
from excluding states from any legislative area occupied by 
Congress unless that body specifically agreed.74 
These acts encouraged and stiffened Southern resistance?5 
Moreover, resistance was effective. While 712 schools were de-
segregated in the first three years after Brown, only 13 were de-
segregated in 1958, 19 in 1959, and 17 in 1960.76 Nine years after 
Brown, fewer than 13,000 black public school students out of 
2,803,882 were in school with whites in the South.77 The oppo-
nents of judicial supremacy in the South in the 1950s and 1960s 
left a legacy of delay and injustice that cannot be forgotten. 
Woodward aptly sums up the post-Brown situation. "[I]t 
was clear that the law of the land as defined by the Supreme 
Court had been defied and that the defiance had the support of 
responsible spokesmen for millions of Americans."78 Further, 
"[t]raditional respect for the law had been overridden by the 
conviction of millions that the Brown decision and its sequels 
were not to be properly regarded as the law of the land."79 Here 
was a consequence of opposition to judicial supremacy. 
72. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 166. 
73. /d. at 167. 
74. /d. at 167-68. 
75. /d. at 168. 
76. /d. at 167. 
77. !d. at 173. 
78. /d. at 162-63. 
79. /d. at 168. 
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In the 1950s and 1960s, popular opposition to judicial su-
premacy had reached a high-water mark, especially in one region 
of the country. This included opposition not only to the Court's 
desegregation decisions, but also to its decisions invalidating of-
ficial public-school prayers and Bible-reading, its increased scru-
tiny of attempts to outlaw obscenity, its protection of the proce-
dural rights of criminal defendants, and its "one man, one vote" 
reapportionment decisions.80 Though there has been populist 
and popular criticism of the Supreme Court and judicial suprem-
acy since the era of Warren Court activism, nothing has come 
close to the intense and widespread assault it withstood then. 
III. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE CRITICS NOW 
While popular opposition to judicial supremacy has re-
ceded, scholarly criticism and even opposition to it rose in the 
1980s and 1990s. This was, not coincidentally, about the time 
Reagan- and Bush-appointed conservatives began to flex their 
muscles in the federal judiciary, especially on the Supreme 
Court. Notably, some academic liberals began arguing to take 
the Constitution away from the courts81 only when the courts 
were taken from the liberals.82 As in times past, how one feels 
about judicial supremacy seems often to depend on whose ox is 
gored, or whose Gore is axed. 
A. WE THE EXECUTIVE 
Whatever the cause of this renewed interest in constraining 
the judiciary, there is now a substantial body of scholarship chal-
lenging at least some aspects of judicial supremacy.83 Among 
conservatives, Michael Paulsen has articulated the most ambi-
tious and radical (in the sense of going to the root of the issue) 
critique of judicial supremacy so far. It is also the one that best 
80. See generally THE IMPACf OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, supra note 36, at 
89-187. 
81. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999). 
82. I am not the first to notice this development. "Tushnet's book is the logical 
culmination of two trends in liberal scholarship: the view that judicial review makes little 
positive difference and the strong disagreement with many decisions of the last quarter-
century by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts." Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith: Amer-
ica Without Judicial Review? 98 MICH. L. REV. 1416, 1417 (2002) (reviewing MARK 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) ). 
83. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 226 n.l9 (listing liberal and conservative critics of 
judicial review); Kramer, supra note 4, at 7 n.9 (listing critics). 
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challenges the premises of judicial supremacists' arguments. I 
will start with a consideration of Paulsen's views. 
Here, in brief, is Paulsen's argument. The executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches are coequal and coordinate parts of 
the federal government. They are "'co-ordinate' in the sense that 
they are all ordained (co-ordained) by the same authority-the 
People themselves-and are, consequently, coequal in title and 
rank as representatives of the People. None is subordinate (the 
very opposite of 'coordinate') to another."84 Paulsen calls this 
the "coordinacy postulate" that underlies separation of powers. 
Judicial supremacy in matters of constitutional interpreta-
tion upsets this design because it elevates the judicial branch 
above the other two, and above the states. Interpretive power "is 
divided and distributed among all three branches of the national 
government, among multiple actors within each branch, and be-
tween federal and state levels of government, with no actor liter-
ally bound by the views of any of the others. "85 "Executive re-
view," the power of the President to interpret the Constitution 
as he sees fit even in the teeth of a contrary judicial interpreta-
tion, is justified not because the framers consciously intended it 
but because it "follow[s] logically from the agreed premises they 
held and the structure the Constitution embodies. ,tf6 
Executive review entails the power of the President, among 
other things, to refuse to enforce a statute he deems unconstitu-
tional, even if the Supreme Court has upheld its constitutional-
ity.87 Most controversially, it entails executive refusal to enforce 
a judicial order in a particular case. The President may simply 
refuse to execute a court decree if "the President does not agree 
with the decision."88 No other recent critic of judicial supremacy 
has gone that far. 
There are many things to say about Paulsen's powerful ar-
gument against judicial supremacy and in favor of recognition of 
independent executive review. I will limit myself here to a few 
thoughts. 
First, whatever the merits of Paulsen's proposed arrange-
ment under which multiple parties (the three federal branches 
and each of the 50 states) have co-equal roles in constitutional 
84. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 228-29 (footnote omitted). 
85. !d. at 222. 
86. !d. at 227. 
87. !d. at 267-72. 
88. !d. at 276. 
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interpretation, it has never been the practice in this country. Ju-
dicial supremacy has been, to an increasing degree over time, the 
practice for the better part of the two centuries since Marbury. 
Thus, while Paulsen is a self-described conservative, his critique 
of judicial supremacy is not itself conservative in the Burkean 
sense of respecting traditional practices that have developed in-
crementally in response to experience. Judicial supremacy, 
whatever its deficiencies, has grown out of the governing experi-
ence of the nation. It has evolved through a process of testing 
and trial. By fits and starts, judicial supremacy gained ground 
among both theorists and the public after Marbury and was 
firmly established in the public mind by the late 19th century, 
though some states resisted when it was in their interest to do 
so.89 Having experienced alternatives involving resistance to ju-
dicial supremacy by the states and by their allies in Congress and 
the executive branch, the people also came to accept judicial su-
premacy after the Civil War and Reconstruction.90 Cooper v. 
Aaron did not invent judicial supremacy; it confirmed it. For a 
true conservative, any change in such a longstanding practice 
must bear a heavy burden of persuasion. Paulsen has not met 
this burden. 
Consider Paulsen's most controversial proposal, that the 
President may refuse to execute court judgments.91 The idea is a 
radical departure from our current practice, a profound repudia-
tion of our history, inconsistent with the President's textual con-
stitutional duty to execute the law, and without practical prece-
dent in the governing experience of the country. 
Ex Parte Merryman,92 involving President Lincoln's unilat-
eral but limited suspension of habeas corpus, is the only arguable 
example where a President acted on a theory of independent in-
terpretive authority to resist a court order.93 But, for several rea-
sons, Merryman is not a very persuasive or powerful precedent 
for Paulsen's view.94 
89. See Part II. 
90. McDONALD, supra note 42, at 224. 
91. Even ardent "departmentalists," who like Paulsen believe the branches have co-
equal roles in interpretation, accept that the President should execute a court's judgment. 
See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1427 .... 
92. 17 F.Cas. 144 (C.C. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
93. The rule is for presidents to comply with court orders, even when the stakes are 
high, as President Truman did during the Korean War. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
94. To be fair, Paulsen does not put much stock in precedent, Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Abrogating Scare Decisis By Scacuce, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000), another un-
Burkean position he vigorously defends. 
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To begin, it is not clear Lincoln was acting on a constitu-
tional theory contrary to the court's. He may have been doing 
so, but his words on the subject were rather ambiguous. Lincoln 
seemed to recognize that his act in unilaterally suspending the 
writ of habeas corpus might be technically unconstitutional, al-
beit necessary under the dire circumstances to save the govern-
ment.95 Recall that Lincoln's suspension of the writ had been 
limited to areas of Maryland where Confederate sympathizers 
were sabotaging and attacking Union troops as they were being 
positioned to defend the capitol.96 
Further, even if Lincoln was defying Chief Justice Taney's 
order on constitutional grounds, he was not defying an order of 
the Supreme Court, the judicial body that possesses ultimate ju-
dicial authority. Taney ruled only as a member of a circuit court. 
If there are degrees of executive defiance of judicial orders, 
ranging from disobeying a district judge to disobeying an appel-
late court to disobeying the Supreme Court, Lincoln's defiance 
was at the lower end of the spectrum. 
Thus, there is no example in our history of a president 
openly defying an order of the Supreme Court. 
Indeed, even if Taney's order could be considered an order 
of the Supreme Court, it may be fairer to characterize Lincoln's 
response as foot-dragging rather than complete defiance. Lin-
coln never responded directly to Taney's order. Merryman was 
confined to Fort McHenry for only seven weeks before he was 
indicted and transferred to civil authorities in Maryland. He was 
never tried.97 . 
Finally, Lincoln himself, criticizing the Court for its decision 
in Dred Scott, recognized, as have other presidents critical of the 
Court, that the Court's decisions in particular cases must be fol-
lowed.98 Lincoln's action in suspending habeas corpus, then, 
seems less like the assertion of a general executive authority to 
95. "[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to 
pieces, lest that one be violated?" Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Ses-
sion (July 4, 1861), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LiNCOLN 430 (Roy P. Basler 
ed. 1953). Presumably, the lone law "to be executed" was the law of the Constitution as 
the courts interpreted it. In his July 4, 1862 message to Congress, Lincoln did argue that 
the Constitution's text was silent on which branch-the executive or the legislative-
could suspend the writ. This suggests an independent constitutional interpretation guided 
his actions. REHNQUIST, supra note 48, at 38. 
96. REHNQUIST, supra note 48, at 11-25. 
97. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 279 n.225. 
98. Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861), in 4 COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 95, at 268. 
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resist judicial judgments than it does the desperate, temporary 
measure of a beleaguered president confronted with half a na-
tion in rebellion and insurrectionists at the gates of the capitol. 
A second response to Paulsen's critique of judicial suprem-
acy is that his critique does not necessarily "logically flow" from 
the "agreed premise" that the federal branches are coequal and 
coordinate. Indeed, abolishing judicial supremacy may under-
mine this agreed premise. Preserving the postulate of coordinacy 
may require judicial supremacy. 
Under a theory of executive review, all of the powers pecu-
liar to the other two branches, plus his own, would be concen-
trated to a greater degree in the hands of the president. As 
Paulsen rightly observes, the president already possesses to some 
degree the powers of all three branches. He possesses executive 
power, of course, since he controls the manner in which laws are 
executed. He possesses legislative power in the form of "the for-
midable negative and agenda-shaping positive power of the 
veto." And he possesses some (so far) limited judicial power to 
interpret the law as he applies it to particular cases.99 Madison, in 
a passage from Federalist 47 that Paulsen quotes, worried about 
precisely this concentration: "The accumulation of all powers 
legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands ... may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."100 
Yet Paulsen's proposal dangerously concentrates power by 
increasing the president's share of the power presently enjoyed 
by the other two branches.101 Executive review in the strong 
Paulsenian form would obviously augment the president's judi-
cial powers since the president now would have not only the 
power to use interpretive authority to apply laws in particular 
circumstances but would also have interpretive authority to de-
cide the general rule that should govern those particular cases. 
The President's share of judicial power would now extend to the 
beginning, middle, and end of the process of law interpretation. 
The President's already considerable influence over the leg-
islative process would also grow. Suppose the president vetoes 
legislation he deems unconstitutional, or more likely, simply un-
99. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 219-20. 
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 244 (James Madison), quoted in Paulsen, supra 
note 10, at 230. 
101. This is true even if the President's constitutional interpretations are not conclu-
sive on the other branches, since the remaining checks on the President's power, princi-
pally impeachment (legislative check) and res judicata (judicial check), are effective only 
if the President decides to respect and be bound by them. 
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wise. Suppose further Congress overrides the veto by the requi-
site 2/3 margin in each house. Under Paulsen's approach, the 
president could then simply refuse to enforce the objectionable 
legislation if he unilaterally and independently deemed it uncon-
stitutional. This is an enormous expansion of the President's role 
in law-making. 
Third, it is not clear that in the absence of judicial suprem-
acy the executive would actually engage in much principled con-
stitutional interpretation, understood here to mean interpreta-
tion independent of the interpreter's own personal policy 
preferences. A number of interpretative tools have commonly 
been offered to restrain judges, including textual, originalist, 
structural, and precedential considerations. In theory, these 
same methods could constrain the executive's interpretive exer-
cise.102 
But how likely is that? Courts employ these interpretive 
methods as a way to compensate for the fact that they are un-
elected; the President, by contrast, faces election every four 
years. This gives the President a democratic legitimacy, a moral 
authority to govern, that the federal courts lack. But it also gives 
the President a powerful incentive to govern based on the politi-
cal imperatives of the moment, reflected in majority consensus, 
rather than on independent constitutional principle. Faced with 
a choice between a strong majority for a particular policy and a 
principled argument that the policy is unconstitutional, how 
likely is the President to buck the public to which he is ultimately 
accountable ?103 
It is true the Court has rarely resisted a powerful national 
consensus and so is clearly influenced by majority will. But at 
least the Court is more likely to stem the tide until the momen-
tary consensus erodes or becomes a more fully deliberated one. 
The controversy over flag-burning comes to mind. The Court 
held unconstitutional a state law criminalizing flag-burning. 104 
The representative branches (reflecting strong public opinion) 
reacted by passing new federalle§islation criminalizing it, legis-
lation the Court also struck down. 05 Many members of Congress 
102. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 340-42. 
103. John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A 
Normative, Descriptive and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 436 
(1993) ("Executive interpretation is likely to reflect the national will more than judicial 
InterpretatiOn because the President is the nation's elected representative."). 
104. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
105. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
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supported a constitutional amendment to overrule the Court's 
decision, an action that might have weakened the First Amend-
ment, but fell just short of the necessary votes in the Senate. In 
time public and congressional passions have subsided, the flag 
remains venerated, and free-speech principles protecting un-
popular expression remain intact. Under Paulsenian executive 
review the President might to this day be bringing prosecutions 
of flag-burners under his independent "interpretation" that the 
Constitution permits criminalization of their acts.106 
Aside from catering to the wishes of a majority against the 
demands of the Constitution, the President may simply act on his 
own policy preferences despite what he thinks the Constitution 
requires or, more likely, will quickly come to the conclusion that 
his policy preferences and the Constitution are fully harmonious. 
When has a President, convinced of the rightness of legislation 
as a matter of wise policy, vetoed that legislation solely because 
he came to his own independent conclusion that it was unconsti-
tutional (aside from what courts had decided)? I cannot think of 
a single time that has happened, even during the golden age 
when presidents thought themselves the equal of the Supreme 
Court in constitutional interpretation. It is at least very rare. 
True, presidents routinely oppose or even veto legislation for 
what they claim are constitutional concerns, as Jackson vetoed 
the re-chartering of the National Bank, but these putative con-
cerns always seem to coincide with the president's policy objec-
tions to the legislation, as did Jackson's. For presidents, the Con-
stitution seems to follow policy, not policy the Constitution.107 
It is also true that the executive branch, even now, routinely 
considers the constitutionality of legislation through the institu-
tional mechanisms of the Justice Department and other parts of 
106. Federal courts could dismiss the prosecutions, following the Supreme Court's 
authority. (Query: under Paulsen's approach, would state courts, as independent consti-
tutional interpreters, have to dismiss flag-burning prosecutions brought in their states?) 
But the chilling effect on speech of facing the expense, worry, and embarrassment of 
prosecution would still occur. 
107. The same could fairly be said of many Supreme Court decisions: For Justices, 
the Constitution seems to follow policy, not policy the Constitution. I have no illusions 
about that. But at least institutional design and the reduction of popular pressures on the 
judiciary point toward principled decisionmaking. And for all its political decisionmak-
ing, I am convinced the Court's interpretive methods have occasionally reached results 
contrary to the Justices' individual policy preferences. I cannot say the same has ever 
been true of the President, whose position is political by design. 
Some would maintain that decisionmaking, whether by presidents or by justices, is always 
a function of policy preference and that interpretive methods used to constrain individual policy 
preferences are ineffective. I doubt Paulsen, however, would take that view. Paulsen, supra note 
10, at 331-42 (describing methods for constraining interpreters). 
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the executive branch. We can concede that the executive officers 
charged with this interpretive mission generally exercise it with a 
great de~ree of skill and in as principled a fashion as humanly 
possible. 08 But, until now, they have done so within a framework 
in which courts generally would pass authoritatively on their 
handiwork, a framework that has disciplined and confined their 
analysis. Cut loose from this framework, as they would be under 
Paulsen's theory of executive review, how likely is it they would 
begin to cater to their boss's perceived and actual policy prefer-
ences rather than to constitutional principle?109 Preferring judi-
cial supremacy to executive review is not just a matter of trusting 
in courts' superior comparative competence to interpret the Con-
stitution,uo but of recognizing their superior comparative incen-
tive to "interpret" it at all. 
Finally, the branch of government into which Paulsen's the-
ory would pour more power is already, as Paulsen candidly and 
admirably acknowledges, "the most dangerous branch."m By 
contrast, even with judicial supremacy in its quiver, the branch 
from which Paulsen would take power is still "the least danger-
ous branch."112 This reverse-Robin Hood constitutional theory 
would take from the relatively power-poor judiciary to give to 
the relatively power-rich executive. 
Let's pause to reflect why the executive is the most danger-
ous branch. The President of the United States commands the 
most powerful military apparatus in the world, indeed, by far the 
most powerful military force the world has ever known. He 
commands, too, the law-enforcement mechanisms of the federal 
government. He influences, as I pointed out above, the legisla-
tive process through the veto. Even in the area of law interpreta-
tion, the President's power is already "by far the greatest," ac-
cording to Paulsen, since the executive is often the first and last 
branch to act on a specific legal controversy.113 Add to all of this 
108. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 391. 
109. Executive branch officials have been candid about the effect of policy consid-
erations on their legal judgments even under a system of judicial supremacy. "Unlike a 
court, the executive branch lawyer is part of an administration that is accountable to the 
People and should thus strive, within the bounds of the best view of the law, to achieve 
its policy goals." Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspec-
tive From the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1330 (2000). 
110. /d. 
111. Paulsen, supra note 10 at 223 ("Truly, the executive-the Presidency-is the 
most dangerous branch."). 
112. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1%2). 
113. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 223. 
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the fact that the executive is the sole unitary branch. A member 
of Congress is one of 535. A Justice is one of nine. Though the 
executive branch comprises many subordinate officials, the 
president is in the final analysis one of one. If a member of Con-
gress or a Justice lets her constitutional authority go to her head, 
tempting her to abuse it, she can be effectively checked by her 
clearer-minded equals. The executive, alone among the 
branches, combines great power with great conceit. 
The danger of that combination is not a matter of theory 
but of historical experience, and here a page of history is worth a 
volume of logic. The United States has not faced a "meltdown 
scenario"114 when one branch attempted to seize all power. But if 
such a scenario were ever to come, it surely would be precipi-
tated by a power-grabbing executive. Consider President Rich-
ard Nixon, a crook on many dimensions who tried to shield his 
own and his subordinates' criminality in a matter involving his 
own reelection campaign. It was a corruption deforming the very 
heart of our political system, one out of many perpetrated by an 
administration whose abuses of power become clearer every 
year. 115 For all the mistakes the Supreme Court has made over 
the past two centuries, and there have been many, there has 
never been anything quite like a "cancer-on-the-judiciary" mo-
ment in which the Court's error threatened the very foundation 
of our political system.116 
Nixon fell from power because, while he had abused just 
about every other prerogative held by the executive, and had 
undermined every other principle of American government, he 
adhered in the end to the doctrine of judicial supremacy.117 That 
adherence caused him to relinquish evidence exposing the ex-
traordinary depth of his administration's corruption, which con-
tributed to a snowball of lefislative action and political opposi-
tion he could not resist.11 But what if Nixon had lived in 
114. The term is Paulsen's. Id. at 324. 
115. Paulsen is unsparing in his condemnation of Nixon as a "crook." Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Nixon Now, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1337, 1343 (1999). 
116. On the other hand, if one believes that Roe authorized and Casey reaffirmed 
the genocide of between one and 1.5 million persons a year, the Supreme Court's ma-
levolence is far worse in terms of its human cost than Nixon's or any other single presi-
dent's. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003). 
117. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Whether the Court should have 
taken jurisdiction of the dispute between Nixon and the special prosecutor, Leon Jawor-
ski, in what was formally an intra-branch dispute is another question. See Calabresi, su-
pra note 10 (arguing the Court should not have heard the matter). 
118. Paulsen calls Nixon the "proximate cause" of Nixon's downfall. Paulsen, supra 
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Paulsen's world, where the background political, legal, and cul-
tural assumption would be that the president may do what he 
wants on matters constitutional and may even refuse to obey a 
court order? Legislative and popular pressures might still even-
tually have slain him, but at what additional delay and cost to the 
nation? 
To add yet more constitutional interpretive power to a 
branch that already effectively has the first and last word on le-
gal meaning, that is already the most powerful and dangerous 
branch, that has a history of abuse of power and hubris, is to in-
crease the risk of the very meltdown we have so far successfully 
avoided undl.!r a system that includes judicial supremacy. I do 
not say this will happen if Paulsen's theory of executive review 
prevails. Presidents will continue to face limited constitutional 
checks from Congress119 and practical political constraints from 
the public. I only predict the risk would rise to an unknowable 
degree. Before we take this leap, we better have a very good rea-
son to do so. I have not yet heard it. 
B. WE THE INDETERMINATE 
Writing from the other end of the political spectrum, Pro-
fessor Larry Kramer offers some of his own observations about 
the Rehnquist Court that might justify reining in the Court's in-
terpretive authority over the meaning of the Constitution, al-
though Kramer offers no specific proposals for doing so. Here, 
briefly, is his argument. 
Kramer, unlike Paulsen, has for now made a pragmatic 
peace with judicial supremacy.120 However, he warns the 
note 115, at 1337. 
119. As Paulsen notes, Congress would still have its impeachment and spending 
powers to check the president's actions. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 223. 
The judiciary, by contrast, would have no constitutional check on the executive beyond the 
power to dismiss unconstitutional criminal prosecutions. !d. at 290-91. Yet how much of a check 
would even this be? For example, among many other criminal procedural guarantees, the 
Constitution requires trial by jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Paulsen argues the president would 
have to obey that command, which is "fairly read to prohibit punishment for crime without a 
jury determination of guilt of the accused." Paulsen, supra note I 0, at 289. But under Paulsen's 
robust executive review the president could interpret the Sixth Amendment to mean trial by an 
impartial jury comprising the Joint Chiefs of Staff, perhaps with appeal only to the president. 
Who could overrule the president's interpretation? Certainly the federal courts could not, since 
the President could ignore them. 
120. "We may come to accept judicial supremacy, because we need someone trust-
worthy to settle certain constitutional disputes once and for all, and for a variety of his-
torical, jurisprudential, and political reasons, the Supreme Court seems like our best op-
tion." Kramer, supra note 4, at 113. "There is a place for judicial supremacy, but it has 
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Rehnquist Court is moving us from judicial supremacy (courts 
having the last word on constitutional meaning) to judicial sov-
ereignty (courts having the only word on constitutional mean-
ing).121 "The Rehnquist Court no longer views itself as first 
among equals," Kramer writes, "but has instead staked its claim 
to being the only institution empowered to speak with author-
ity. "122 This judicial "power grab" has come at the expense of 
what Kramer calls "popular constitutionalism," the responsibil-
ity of "We the People" to see that the Constitution is properly 
interpreted and implemented.123 Under popular constitutional-
ism, "government officials are the regulated, not the regulators, 
and final interpretive authority rests with the people. "124 
In the early days of the republic, the people exercised their 
influence on constitutional meaning through a variety of tools. If 
Congress tried to overstep its constitutional limits the people 
would constrain it "via elections, juries, popular outcries, or, in 
the unlikely event all of these failed, by more violent forms of 
opposition. "125 By 1840, as democratic practice grew more insti-
tutionalized and suffrage expanded, "popular constitutionalism 
meant popular will as expressed by and through elected repre-
sentatives."126 Nowadays, popular constitutionalism is expressed 
through "mediating institutions" such as "political parties, lob-
bies, the media, public interest organizations, unions, and the 
like."127 Conspicuously missing from this list is the role of the 
states as a voice of popular constitutionalism. 
A reconciliation between judicial supremacy and popular 
constitutionalism was achieved through what Kramer calls "the 
New Deal settlement." This settlement had three elements: (1) 
judicial enforcement of constitutional prohibitions on the states; 
(2) judicial deference regarding the definition and scope of con-
gressional and executive powers; and (3) judicial enforcement of 
individual rights, including the Bill of Rights, the 14th Amend-
ment (including the rights of racial and other minorities), voting 
bounds." /d. at 163. It appears, however, that Kramer may have withdrawn even this 
concession to judicial authority in a forthcoming book. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (forthcom-
ing 2003). 
121. Kramer, supra note 4, at 13. 
122. ld. at 14. 
123. ld. at 12. 
124. /d. at 86. 
125. ld. at 72. 
126. ld. at 113. 
127. ld. at 164. 
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rights, and the operation of the political process.128 This accom-
modation was consistent with historical practice under which the 
Court rarely intervened to enforce limits on federal legislative 
and executive authority, yet actively superintended the role of 
the states.129 It also "offered a relatively sensible allocation of re-
sponsibilities." Individual rights are least well handled by majori-
tarian institutions. But placing rigid limits on national authority 
in a complex environment "is much too complicated" for the 
Court.130 That task should be left to popular constitutionalism, 
namely to Congress itself. 
The problem, for Kramer, is that "[t]he Rehnquist Court 
has, quite simply and literally, abandoned the New Deal settle-
ment, reoccupying ground taken for the people in the 1930s 
without yielding so much as an inch of territory already held. "131 
In the field of individual rights, most (though not all) of the cur-
rent Court's activism "has been in the service of conservative po-
litical ends," such as undermining affirmative action and afford-
ing somewhat greater protection to economic liberties.132 
Otherwise, the Court has largely halted the Warren and Burger 
Courts' expansion of individual rights.133 
Kramer is far more concerned, however, about the Court's 
renewed enforcement of limits on Congress's power under the 
Commerce Clause. The key cases are United States v. Lopez/34 
which invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, and United 
States v. Morrison, 135 which invalidated part of the Violence 
Against Women Act (VA WA). Here, Kramer claims that the 
Court has "restored heightened scrutiny," abandoning a six-
decade practice of deference. 136 
Kramer's argument, like Paulsen's, is nuanced and complex. 
After some general thoughts on the idea of "popular constitu-
tionalism," I will confine myself to a few issues dealing primarily 
with the Court's expansion of its own interpretive authority and 
its limitations on congressional power. 137 
128. /d. at 122. 
129. /d. at 124-25. 
130. /d. at 126-27. 
131. /d. at 128. 
132. !d. at 131. 
133. /d. at 130. 
134. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
135. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
. 136. Kramer, supra note 4, at 137. See Kramer's discussion of Lopez and Morrison, 
Ld. at 138-44. 
137. I agree with Kramer that Bush v. Gore wrongly prevented remand of the dis-
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Popular constitutionalism is an appealing concept. It high-
lights the role of the people in all aspects of self-government, the 
whole point of this enterprise called the United States. Simply 
articulating the concept encourages the people to treat seriously 
their government. But it is also a frustratingly amorphous con-
cept. After reading 169 pages of densely-footnoted text, I am un-
clear precisely what it means, how it is supposed to operate in 
practice, or what constitutional significance we should attach to 
it. Popular constitutionalism may be neither popular nor consti-
tutionalism. 
How do we know when the expression of popular constitu-
tionalism is sufficiently "popular" to be called a form of "consti-
tutionalism"? I know when the Court has reached a conclusion 
about the meaning of the Constitution because I can count to 
five. But how are we to know when popular constitutionalism 
has reached some determination about constitutional meaning? 
What quantum or duration of consensus among the "political 
parties, lobbies, the media, public interest organizations, unions, 
and the like" is required before we can say with confidence "the 
people" have spoken in their constitutional voice?138 
Further, how can we be sure popular constitutionalism is 
even "constitutionalism"? How do we know the people's expres-
sion reflects a view about the nation's fundamental law rather 
than a very strong policy preference (favoring, for example, laws 
that require a powerful central government) arrived at inde-
pendent of any consideration of the Constitution's meaning? 
The concern here is similar to my concern with Paulsen's "execu-
tive review." It is not so much that the people (or the executive, 
in Paulsen's world) will "err" in constitutional interpretation (al-
though I wonder if more than five out of 100 citizens can name a 
constitutional right other than "free speech" or the "right to bear 
arms"). It is that they will not interpret the Constitution at all. 
Like the president, the people will act on expediency, not on 
constitutional principle. The same is true for their elected repre-
sentatives in Congress, for whom constitutional meaning also 
seems to be determined by policy preference independent of the 
Constitution. 
pute to the Florida courts. !d. at 154. I suspect, however, that the Court's action had little 
to do with its distrust of potential congressional handling of the dispute and much to do 
with concern that the Florida Supreme Court was acting in a partisan fashion. 
138. Bruce Ackerman has a theory to explain when such constitutional moments 
arrive, Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279 (1999), but 
Kramer has not adopted it. 
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Aside from the indeterminacy of popular constitutionalism, 
let's consider Kramer's argument that the Rehnquist Court is 
robbing us of it by expanding its own interpretive domain while 
at the same time limiting congressional power. Kramer is con-
vincing in arguing that the rhetoric of some Rehnquist Court 
opinions bespeaks a judicial hauteur about the Court's role in 
constitutional interpretation. Two quibbles: First, I am not per-
suaded that the current Court's rhetoric is more self-
congratulatory and self-aggrandizing than that of the Warren or 
Burger Courts. Second, I would have emphasized more than 
Kramer does the current Court's truly breathtaking rhetoric in 
Casey, in which the Court claimed to speak before all others on 
constitutional matters and asserted a power to call the contend-
ing sides in a national controversy to end their bitter constitu-
tional dispute. That is a rhetorical defiance of popular constitu-
tionalism that may be unequaled in the Court's history. Kramer 
gives Casey some attention in this regard/39 but not nearly 
enough. It would fit uneasily, I think, with Kramer's claim that 
the Court's arrogance is a product of conservative triumphalism. 
Kramer is less convincing in arguing that the substantive re-
sults in Rehnquist Court decisions unravel the New Deal settle-
ment on the issue of congressional power. First, note that the 
New Deal settlement, as described by Kramer, is itself a repudia-
tion of the underlying concern that Marshall used to justify judi-
cial review in Marbury. Marshall did not justify judicial review in 
Marbury as a method to protect individual rights or to ensure 
federal supremacy over the states. To Marshall, judicial review 
was needed in order to limit the gowers of the other federal 
branches, especially the Congress.1 "The powers of the legisla-
ture are defined and limited .... The distinction between a gov-
ernment of limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those 
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are im-
posed .... "141 If the Constitution is not an "absurdity," the con-
stitutional limits on the power of the legislature cannot be "al-
terable when the legislature shall please to alter it."142 This 
"would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipo-
tence .... "143 To the extent the Court is fumbling toward re-
139. Kramer, supra note 4, at 136 (devoting two sentences to Casey). 
140. It is true, however, that Marshall spent much of the next thirty years on the 
Court expanding federal authority and constraining that of the states. See, e.g., 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
141. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176. 
142. !d. at 177. 
143. /d. at 178. 
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newed judicially enforceable limits on congressional power, it is 
acting in the spirit of Marbury. 
Second, the limits placed on Congress's commerce clause 
power by the Rehnquist Court have themselves been limited.144 
Let's first do the math. In the eight years since the supposed re-
pudiation of the New Deal settlement in this area began, the 
Court has invalidated exactly two federal laws as exceeding the 
judicially enforceable limits of the commerce clause (the Gun-
Free School Zones Act in Lopez and the VA W A in Morrison). 
In a third case, involving federal regulation of wetlands, the 
Court construed the Clean Water Act narrowly to avoid poten-
tial constitutional problems presented by "significant impinge-
ment of the States' traditional and primary power over land and 
water use. "145 Of course, more such invalidations could come 
anytime, but so far, at least, this is a judicial revolution on a very 
slow fuse. 
Note also the limited nature, so far, of the substantive limi-
tation placed on Congress's commerce power. If the Court is 
truly applying "heightened scrutiny" to exercises of that power-
an unstated though plausible reading of Lopez and Morrison-it 
is only doing so in cases where Congress is regulating what the 
Court regards as intrastate "noneconomic activity." In both Lo-
pez and Morrison, it was only after the Court determined Con-
gress was regulating activity that was both intrastate and none-
conomic that it applied "heightened scrutiny." 
Whatever one thinks of the distinction between economic 
and noneconomic activity, it does not appear so far to be a 
stronp, basis for challenging much of what Congress actually 
does. 46 Although the Court has not made clear where the eco-
nomic-noneconomic line is to be drawn, it appears "economic" 
will have an expansive meaning. It includes, for example, every 
commerce-power regulation of intrastate activity the Court has 
144. So long as the Court's commerce clause limitations remain modest, its stingy 
reading of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment will have 
little practical effect since, as Kramer acknowledges, "federal lawmakers can still do 
many of the same things under the commerce clause." Kramer, supra note 4, at 148. 
145. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (the Army Corps exceeded its statutory powers under the 
Clean Water Act by attempting to regulate the landfill of small ponds). The case was de-
cided after Kramer's article appeared. 
146. Kramer candidly admits that "[w)e do not yet know how aggressive [the Court] 
plans to be in restricting what Congress can do under the commerce clause," yet he fears 
the worst because "the conservative litigation machine is gearing up." Kramer, supra 
note 4, at 159-60. 
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ever approved in its history.147 Thus, in Lopez the Court even re-
affirmed Wickard v. Filburn/48 a case in which the Court allowed 
Congress to regulate the production and consumption of wheat 
grown entirely for home consumption.149 
Nothing in the Court's new commerce clause jurisprudence 
yet suggests it is headed for a return to its pre-Jones & Laughlin 
Steel days. The National Labor Relations Act and the rest of the 
New Deal are safe, as are the various civil rights acts, and seem-
ingly almost everything else Congress regulated from 1937 to 
1995. That is a huge domain for congressional power. 
Second, the Court may not have silenced popular constitu-
tionalism in Congress so much as refused to silence its expres-
sion in the states. It has done this in two ways. First, it has re-
sisted additional encroachments on areas of traditional state 
authority where the people have always been free to govern 
themselves at the level of government closest to them. A con-
cern along these lines is expressed in both Lopez and Morrison, 
where the Court openly worried that Congress's next regulatory 
target might be states' general criminal and family law. In Lopez, 
for example, the defendant was initially charged under a state 
law prohibiting gun possession in public schools. Second, every 
recognition of an "individual right" against state law imposes a 
corresponding limitation on the power of the people to govern 
themselves-to express their constitutional priorities-through 
their elected state representatives. To the extent the Court has 
been less aggressive in recognizing "new rights" it has preserved 
a space for the legislative expression of popular constitutional-
ism in the states. 
CONCLUSION 
In a representative democracy, the very phrase "judicial su-
premacy" is bound to cause alarm. It conjures an image of aloof 
and elitist judges ruling the people like "a bevy of Platonic 
Guardians."150 But in this case the alarm is unjustified; the 
147. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). ("(T]hus far in our nation's 
history our cases have upheld commerce clause regulation of intrastate activity only 
where that activity is economic in nature.") 
148. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). For an excellent discussion of the background, see Jim 
Chen, Filburn's Forgotten Footnote, 82 MINN. L. REV. 249 (1997). 
149. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 573-74 (1995) (reaffirming Wickard and 
other commerce clause decisions of the post-New Deal era). 
150. "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardi-
ans, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." LEARNED HAND, 
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phrase has far more bark than bite. The rule of the judges is very 
limited at best, playing at the edges of national and state policy, 
and responsive to the zeitgeist even in its limited domain. 
I suspect that on balance judicial supremacy has been a 
good thing for our democracy. Marbury began the project of 
having unelected courts occasionally nudge popular institutions 
in the direction of constitutional principle. This project has, 
through much trial and error, played at least a small role in get-
ting us where we are today: a free people and an enormously 
prosperous nation whose many imperfections remain correctable 
through self-government. That's not to say the courts have al-
ways gotten the constitutional principles right. In times of great 
national uproar they have been practically powerless to prevent 
the abuse of governmental power. But the people are certainly 
not discontent with judicial supremacy. 
Perhaps we can suddenly end this project, strip the Court of 
its historically developed role in our national life, and hope for 
the best. Probably nothing much bad will happen; other democ-
ratic nations, with different histories and cultures to be sure, 
have managed without judicial supremacy. Or perhaps even 
some good will come of the change. But given what we've 
achieved with what we've got, why take that chance? 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). 
